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The Nature of Legal Argument: The
Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm
by
RICHARD K. GREENSTEIN*
The idea of black letter law seduces us. We crave coherence and
certainty in the law as we do in many areas of our lives. We know better,
of course. We know that legal doctrine is often indeterminate-that in a
particular case, perfectly convincing arguments supporting one conclu-
sion can often be countered by perfectly convincing arguments support-
ing the opposite conclusion. Yet we continue to search for rules,
principles, tests, approaches-anything that will impose order on doc-
trine. Nowhere is the inherent frustration of this quest more vividly il-
lustrated than in the debates concerning the due process limitations on
the assertion of personal jurisdiction by state courts.
The conventional view of personal jurisdiction' goes something like
this: In the beginning, the Supreme Court understood jurisdiction to be
fundamentally the exercise of physical power by the state, limited, by
analogy to principles of international law, to the state's geographic terri-
tory. Accordingly, a state court could not, consistent with due process,
assert jurisdiction over someone beyond its borders unless that individual
somehow submitted himself or otherwise consented to jurisdiction. This
was the teaching of Pennoyer v. Neff. 2
This early view was thought to have changed in 1948 when the
Supreme Court announced a new analysis of the due process limitations
on personal jurisdiction. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 the
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Temple University. B.A. 1970, Wesleyan Uni-
versity; J.D. 1973, Vanderbilt University; LL.M. 1982, Temple University.
I wish to express my deep gratitude to Professors Jane Baron, Robert Bartow, and David
Sonenshein, of Temple University School of Law, for their exceptionally helpful insights in
response to an earlier version of this article. I would also like to blame them for all the
remaining defects in my analysis, but I cannot; these lingering deficiencies are my responsibil-
ity alone.
1. Although this Essay focuses on in personam jurisdiction, it should be kept in mind
that derivative principles apply to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 207-12 (1977).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Although the Pennoyer controversy arose prior to the ratifica-
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Court focused on whether the defendant had sufficient minimum con-
tacts with the forum state to make the state's exercise of jurisdiction con-
sistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."4
But Pennoyer refused to die. Despite the Court's insistence that ju-
risdictional questions were to be evaluated in light of the "fair play and
substantial justice" standard of International Shoe, 5 the concern with ter-
ritorial sovereignty continued to play a role in occasional personal juris-
diction cases. 6 Moreover, the Court seemed to be sending mixed signals
about how fairness and justice were to be determined. Sometimes the
court balanced the defendant's interests along with those of plaintiff, the
forum state, and the nation;7 yet other times, the approach focused ex-
clusively on the defendant.8
The search for order has led to predictably divergent reactions
among scholars in the field. Some have identified multiple "tests" for
personal jurisdiction that vary according to the substantive nature of the
case.9 Others have criticized the Supreme Court's reasoning in various
post-International Shoe cases as "arbitrary,"' 0  "muddled,"" or
"grounded in faulty logic.' 12
This Essay offers an alternative approach. The doctrine of personal
jurisdiction, as historically articulated by the Supreme Court, is consis-
tent and coherent-although it may not yield a single test that will deter-
mine the answer to jurisdictional questions in all cases, it defines the
constitutional dimensions of jurisdiction over persons as comprising a
group of specific, intertwined, but irreconcilable themes and attendant
principles. 13 These themes have coexisted in tension in all of the personal
tion of the fourteenth amendment, the Court indicated that its principles would henceforth be
understood as requirements of due process. Id. at 316.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
6. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). Territorial sovereignty remained the basis for in rem
and quasi in rem jurisdiction until the Supreme Court decided Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977).
7. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
8. See, e.g., Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254.
9. E.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 81-83 (3d ed. 1985).
10. Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reap-
praisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429, 464 (1981).
11. Sonenshein, The Error of a Balancing Approach to the Due Process Determination of
Jurisdiction over the Person, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 47, 53 (1986).
12. Id. at 57.
13. The idea of irreconcilable themes does not necessarily denote themes in opposition
(although, as will become apparent, they may be in opposition in certain instances). Rather, it
describes themes that present fundamentally distinct concerns or fundamentally distinct per-
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jurisdiction cases, from Pennoyer to the most recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on the subject.
Although the themes are irreconcilable, it is possible for any one or
group of them to dominate and determine the outcome of a particular
case. Thus, what appears in the conventional view of jurisdiction to be
abrupt shifts in doctrine or inconsistent decisions, simply reflects the ever
shifting relationship among the themes. It is the constant presence of the
themes, not their resolution into a particular approach, that gives the law
of personal jurisdiction its unity.
Section I of this Essay attempts to untangle these themes and to
describe them in some detail. Section II argues that the coexistence of
irreconcilable themes is inherent in all legal doctrine. Indeed, an under-
standing of this fact helps illuminate some of the mysteries of legal argu-
ment: What is the difference between good legal arguments and bad
ones? Why are some cases easy (all the good legal arguments lead to the
same conclusion) while other cases are hard (good legal arguments lead
to opposite conclusions)? Finally, section III tentatively explores some
of the implications of this discussion for an important question that has
received considerable attention in recent years: What do we mean when
we characterize litigation as involving conflicting claims about legal
rights? I conclude that the "right" that litigants have is to a conscien-
tious consideration of the themes inherent in the legal doctrine in ques-
tion, not to any particular substantive outcome.
I. The Structure of Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine
Personal jurisdiction involves the assertion of authority over the in-
dividual by a social institution: the court. We can think about the rela-
tionship between the individual and society in two fundamentally
different and irreconcilable ways, both of which exist within the doctrine
of jurisdiction.
Personal jurisdiction also involves the exercise of authority by a
state, which coexists with other states within the nation. We can think
about the relationship between the state and the nation in two fundamen-
tally different and irreconcilable ways, both of which also exist within the
doctrine of jurisdiction.
The following analysis identifies these four themes and documents
their coexistence in personal jurisdiction doctrine by showing how each
finds expression in various Supreme Court cases.
spectives on the same concern. In short, irreconcilable themes cannot be collapsed into a
single theme.
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A. Themes Relating to the Relationship Between the Individual and Society
One theme, which might be termed the "individualist theme," en-
compasses two perspectives of the relationship between the individual
and society. At one extreme, the individual experiences society as wholly
separate from herself. The individual seeks maximum liberty to pursue
her goals. She sees society as a threat to that liberty; each exercise of
power by society is an imposition upon the individual's autonomy.
14
A more moderate version of this theme conceives of society as a
creation of individuals, designed to serve certain basic, limited needs,
such as services and security. Since society is a tool of individuals, it
derives its legitimacy from individuals. Accordingly, any exercise of au-
thority by society over the individual is justified only on the basis of the
individual's consent to that authority. 15
If you held the individualist view of the relationship of the individ-
ual to society, you might think about personal jurisdiction in a particular
way. You might understand jurisdiction as the voluntary acceptance of
social authority by the individual or, alternatively, as the assertion of
brute force over the individual by a hostile society. From the first per-
spective, you would see the assumption of jurisdiction, in the absence of
consent, as simply an exercise of "physical power" 16 over the individual;
jurisdiction under such conditions would be a de facto recognition of so-
ciety's superior might. From the second perspective, you would see the
exercise of jurisdiction by a court over the individual as legitimate only
when the individual has freely "submitted" 17 to the court's authority;
you would talk about jurisdiction being based on the "consent" 18 of the
party. That submission or consent would be expressed either through
explicit statements or through the "purposeful" 19 conduct of the individ-
ual and on her ability to "foresee" 20 that legal action based on that con-
duct might be brought in a particular forum.
A second theme, which might be termed the "communitarian
14. See Horwitz, Introduction to THE ANARCHISTS 47-52 (I. Horwitz ed. 1964) (describ-
ing individualist anarchist theory).
15. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Peardon ed. 1960) (1690);
R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
16. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
17. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 (1938).
18. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Bagdon v. Philadelphia &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 437, 111 N.E. 1075, 1076 (1976).
19. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); Buckeye Boiler Co. v.
Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 901, 458 P.2d 7, 63-64, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1969); see
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
20. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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theme," presents another view of the relationship between the individual
and society. This view perceives the individual as a fundamentally social
being. Society is not an entity created by the free wills of individuals to
serve their individual goals; rather, society is the basic unit through
which the individual receives not only sustenance, but self-definition.
From this viewpoint, the rights of the individual derive from society.
The interests of the individual, while perhaps of concern to society, are
ultimately subordinate to societal interests.21
If you held the communitarian view of the relationship between the
individual and society, you might think about personal jurisdiction in a
particular way. You might see jurisdiction as primarily serving the
"public interest,"'22 with a chief concern being "the orderly administra-
tion of justice."'2 3 The individual's obligation to acknowledge the legiti-
macy of the court's exercise of authority would be based on a "duty"24
owed to society; it would be a "responsibility," arising out of his "rela-
tionship to the state." 25
The due process limitations on jurisdiction would depend not on the
subjective will of the individual, but on a public standard of "justice" and
"fair play."'26 The "reasonableness" 27 of subjecting a defendant to the
court's power would be measured by balancing the defendant's interests
against those of the forum state, the plaintiff, and the nation.28
In reality, of course, we do not hold either the individualist or the
communitarian view of the relationship between the individual and soci-
ety exclusively. Instead, we hold both views simultaneously and irrecon-
cilably. We believe that the individual is both antagonistic to and an
integral part of society.29 We believe, for example, that society has no
right to invade the privacy of the individual and that society nevertheless
has an obligation to invade individual privacy to insure public safety. We
believe that society imposes upon the liberty of the individual when it
confiscates property through taxation; yet we believe that society has an
21. See, eg., Marx & Engels, The German Ideology, in READER IN MARXIST PHILOSO-
PHY 74-75 (H. Selsam & H. Martel eds. 1963).
22. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
23. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
24. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464 (1940).
25. Id.
26. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
27. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 436, 176
N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961).
28. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
29. Cf Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV.
205, 211-21 (1979) (discussing this "fundamental contradiction").
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obligation to provide certain public services that must be funded through
taxation.
Similarly, we hold both views-simultaneously and irreconcilably-
regarding the legitimate bases of personal jurisdiction. As will be illus-
trated below, the conceptions of jurisdiction that flow from these views
are present in each of the Supreme Court's decisions on the subject.
B. Themes Relating to the Relationship Between the State and the Nation
One way of thinking about states is to analogize them to sovereign
nations. From this viewpoint, which underlies what might be termed the
"state soveriegnity theme," the states have agreed to relinquish limited
powers-limited parts of their sovereignty-to the national government.
But in all other respects, each state has retained sovereign control over its
affairs. 30
If you had this view of the relationship of the state to the nation, you
might think about personal jurisdiction in a particular way. You might
characterize jurisdiction as the exercise by an "independent State" 31 of
"sovereign ' 32 power and appeal to principles of "public [international]
law" 33 to determine the extent of that power. Those principles would tell
you that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory," but that "no State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property with-
out its territory. '34
You might also conclude that a state can always exercise jurisdiction
over its domiciliaries.35 This is so because domicile in a state is the
equivalent of "citizenship" 36 in a nation, and nations have traditionally
exercised jurisdiction over their citizens even when they are physically
absent from the state.37
But as with the relationship between the individual and society,
there is another view of the relationship between the state and the nation.
From this point of view, states are seen as integral parts of a single na-
30. This idea receives constitutional expression in the tenth amendment to the United
States Constitution: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
31. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
32. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
33. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
34. Id.
35. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
36. Id. at 463.
37. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 215, 221 (1932).
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tion-a view which underlies what we will call the "nationalist theme. ' 38
Indeed, political, social, cultural, and commercial realities, together with
technological developments in transportation and communication, have
made the United States an increasingly unified country and have con-
comitantly rendered state borders more and more irrelevant.
If you held this view of the relationship between the state and the
nation, you might think about personal jurisdiction in a particular way.
You might begin by observing that the state's recognition and enforce-
ment of the laws and judgments of sister states is not a matter of comity
(as it would be if states were sovereign nations), but a constitutional obli-
gation imposed by the "full faith and credit clause."' 39 In commercial
cases, you would focus on how the "increasing nationalization of com-
merce" 4 has made state lines less significant; you would observe that
"[a]s technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a simi-
lar increase. '41 You would consider "the interstate judicial system's in-
terest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," 42 and
the "shared interests of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social policies. ' 43 You would also assess the impact of "modem
transportation and communication" 44 on the propriety of subjecting per-
sons outside the state to the court's authority.
In reality, of course, we do not hold either of these views of the
relationship between the state and nation exclusively. We think of the
United States as a single country and as a collection of individual states.
It is the essence of federalism to hold these two views simultaneously
and irreconcilably. 45 Again, as will be illustrated below, both of the con-
ceptions of jurisdiction that flow from these views are present in each of
the Supreme Court's decisions on the subject.
C. The Interplay of Themes
This section explores the interrelationship among the four jurisdic-
tional themes by means of two comparisons. The first is between two
38. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729.
39. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 221 (1905); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729.
40. McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1952).
41. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
42. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
43. Id.
44. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
45. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 9, at 81-83.
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landmark cases, Pennoyer v. Neff46 and International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington.47 The second is among a trio of recent Supreme Court decisions:
Kulko v. Superior Court,48 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,49
and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 50
The goal of these comparisons is to illustrate how, although all four
themes are present in every case concerning personal jurisdiction, a shift-
ing emphasis among the themes can produce vastly different results. In
Pennoyer and International Shoe, the change in emphasis results in what
are perceived as two fundamentally different approaches to jurisdictional
issues. In Kulko, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Burger King, the mean-
ing of a key concept-"purposeful availment"-undergoes perceptible
change as the interplay among the four, ever-present themes varies from
one case to another.
The following discussion will examine the two themes relating to the
relationship between the individual and society-the "individualist" 51
and "communitarian" 52 themes-and the two fhemes relating to the rela-
tionship between the state and the nation-the "state sovereignty" 53 and
"nationalist" 54 themes.
(1) Pennoyer and International Shoe
The issue before the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff was
whether the federal courts should recognize as valid a personal judgment
entered against Neff by an Oregon state court in a previous lawsuit. In
the original suit, the Oregon court had asserted jurisdiction over Neff
even though he was neither domiciled nor actually present in the state.
The United States Supreme Court held that the Oregon court lacked the
power to assume jurisdiction in such a case and that the judgment was
consequently void. 55
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the State of Washington
asserted jurisdiction over the International Shoe Company for the pur-
pose of collecting contributions allegedly owed to the state's unemploy-
ment insurance fund, based on the company's business activities in the
46. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
47. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
48. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
49. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
50. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
51. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
55. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
state. The nature of those activities, crucial to the Court's analysis of the
jurisdictional question, was described as follows:
Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of
business in St. Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture and
sale of shoes and other footwear....
Appellant has no office in Washington and makes no contracts
either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock
of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in
intrastate commerce. During the years from 1937 to 1940, now in
question, appellant employed eleven to thirteen salesmen under direct
supervision and control of sales managers located in St. Louis. These
salesmen resided in Washington; their principal activities were con-
fined to that state; and they were compensated by commissions based
upon the amount of their sales. The commissions for each year totaled
more than $31,000. Appellant supplies its salesmen with a line of sam-
ples, each consisting of one shoe of a pair, which they display to pro-
spective purchasers. On occasion they rent permanent sample rooms,
for exhibiting samples, in business buildings, or rent rooms in hotels or
business buildings temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such rent-
als is reimbursed by appellant.
The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their sam-
ples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on
terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appel-
lant's office in St. Louis for acceptance or rejection, and then accepted,
the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped f.o.b. from points
outside Washington to the purchasers within the state. All merchan-
dise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from
which collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into
contracts or to make collections.56
On these facts, the Court concluded that Washington could constitution-
ally assert jurisdiction over International Shoe.57 In so ruling, the Court
refused to focus its analysis on whether the company had been "present"
in the state,58 an issue of crucial importance in Pennoyer. Instead, juris-
diction was justified on the basis of "contacts" with the state.59
The different approaches in the two cases can be explained by their
emphasis on different themes. Pennoyer is dominated by state sover-
eignty rhetoric:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect
independent, many of the rights and powers which originally belonged
to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitu-
tion. But, except as restrained and limited by the instrument, they pos-
sess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the
principles of public [international] law to which we have referred are
56. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-14.
57. Id. at 321.
58. See id. at 315-17, 321.
59. Id. at 320.
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applicable to them.60
Those "principles of public [international] law" included the notions of
plenary sovereignty over persons and property within the state's borders
and a correlative lack of such power outside those borders. 6' The latter
point was critical in light of Neff's residence in California at the time the
Oregon court sought to assert its jurisdiction over him. "[A]ny direct
exertion of authority over [persons outside the state] in an attempt ... to
enforce an extraterritorial jurisdiction by [the state's] tribunals, would be
deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the State in which
the persons are domiciled ... and be resisted as usurpation.62
By contrast, the emphasis in International Shoe was on communitar-
ian values. Whether the constitutional requirements of personal jurisdic-
tion had been satisfied depended upon "the quality and nature of
[International Shoe's] activity in relation to the fair and orderly adminis-
tration of the law which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure."'63 According to the Court, jurisdiction may be asserted over an
absent individual when he or she has "certain minimum contacts with
[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "6 This test was met
under the facts of International Shoe because the company had benefited
from the laws of Washington in the conduct of its business in the state.6 5
Therefore, it was fair to impose upon the company the obligation to de-
fend a lawsuit arising out of those activities.66
While it is true that each case has a dominant theme, it would be
mistaken to conclude that the cases do not reflect the remaining themes.
Implicit throughout the Pennoyer opinion is the individualist theme that
personal jurisdiction, in the absence of a "voluntary appearance" 67 by the
defendant, is a function of the state's superior physical power over the
individual. The extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction would be tanta-
mount to an invasion of a sister sovereign state. At the same time, the
Court acknowledged the propriety of the extraterritorial assertion of ju-
risdiction in a divorce action on the communitarian ground of simple
justice: If the defendant moved to a state that would not permit the di-
vorce, the plaintiff's own state should proceed "without personal service
60. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 723.
63. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
64. Id. at 316.
65. Id. at 320.
66. Id.
67. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729.
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of process or personal notice to the offending party," otherwise, "the in-
jured citizen would be without redress. '6 8 The Court made no serious
attempt to reconcile these positions.
Pennoyer also relied on important nationalist considerations. As in-
dicated above, the opinion understands jurisdiction as an assertion of
power. But as the Court well knows, physical power is not, in fact, used
against the defendant. Rather, the state asserts jurisdiction through ser-
vice of process, which is a symbolic exercise of power, 69 after which the
defendant is free to leave the state. But if the state does not have actual
physical power over the defendant, how can it enforce an adjudication of
the defendant's legal rights? The answer is that the Constitution's "full
faith and credit" clause,70 as implemented by Congress, 71 requires sister
states to recognize each other's adjudicatory authority following valid
service of process and, in most instances, to enforce judgments entered
pursuant to that authority. 72 This gives effect to the nationalist interest.
This idea that the efficacy of jurisdiction and judgments depends
upon the legal duty of sister states (and the federal government) to recog-
nize certain symbolic acts of the state seems inconsistent with the idea
that jurisdiction is based upon the exercise of physical power that stops
at the state's borders. The Pennoyer Court did not attempt to reconcile
these two positions.
International Shoe also reveals all four themes. The communitarian
theme regarding the relationship between the individual and society is, as
noted above, dominant. Yet, the Court also sounded the individualist
theme in its reference to the traditional notion that a corporation "con-
sents"73 to jurisdiction when it engages in business activities in the forum
state. The Court discussed this consent theory and ultimately dismissed
it as a "legal fiction." 74 What emerged in its place is the idea that when a
defendant has engaged in purposeful, beneficial activities in the state, the
state is entitled to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant-at
least with regard to activities arising out of those activities.75 This notion
of jurisdiction as a quid pro quo that flows from the defendant's choice
68. Id. at 734-35.
69. See id. at 719-20, 727.
70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964).
72. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 729-33.
73. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318-19.
74. Id.
75. Specifically, the Court discussed this concept in terms of "purposeful availment" and
"forseeability." See infra notes 80-122 and accompanying text.
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expresses not only the communitarian idea of fairness, but also the indi-
vidualist concept of the essential, legitimating importance of free will.
International Shoe presents the state sovereignty theme through the
very concept of "minimum contacts." Nothing in the Court's basic con-
cern with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" neces-
sarily ties due process to a requirement that the defendant have
"contacts, ties, or relations" 76 with the forum state. Indeed, it is easy to
hypothesize situations in which the exercise of jurisdiction over a defend-
ant without such contacts would be fair or, at least, would not be so
unfair as to constitute a denial of due process.7 7 Thus, the Court's insis-
tence upon the fundamental importance of minimum contacts between
the defendant and the forum state's territory can be seen as the continu-
ing influence of the idea of state sovereignty.
At the same time that the state sovereignty theme tends to limit the
scope of personal jurisdiction through the minimum contacts require-
ment, a strong nationalist theme in International Shoe tends to expand
jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving commercial enterprises. As
the Supreme Court would subsequently note in a case applying Interna-
tional Shoe:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly dis-
cernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction
over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attrib-
utable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy
over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or
more States and may involve parties separated by a full continent.
With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great in-
crease in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines.
At the same time modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
State where he engages in economic activity. 78
In sum, the apparent difference in the approaches taken by the
Supreme Court in Pennoyer and International Shoe merely reflects the
dominance of different themes in the two cases. Nevertheless, all four
themes seem to be alive in each case. Because these themes are irrecon-
cilable, they coexist in constant tension; because they coexist in constant
tension, no obvious reason suggests that the balance struck in Interna-
tional Shoe should be any more stable than that struck in Pennoyer. This
inherent instability of jurisdiction doctrine can be demonstrated by com-
paring three cases decided more than thirty years after International
76. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
77. Consider, for instance, the "rare parrot" hypothetical discussed in the text at 324.
78. McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1952).
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Shoe. 79
(2) Kulko, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Burger King
The trio of Kulko v. Superior Court,80 World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,81 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 82 serves as a
useful vehicle for investigating the Supreme Court's approach to personal
jurisdiction because each case focuses, in part, upon whether the defend-
ant had conducted activities whereby he "purposely availed himself" of
the "benefits and protections" of the forum state.83 This purposeful
availment was deemed absent in Kulko and World- Wide Volkswagen, but
present in Burger King. More importantly, the meaning of "purposeful
availment" underwent subtle but crucial changes in the cases. These
changes reflect the shifting relationship among the four themes of per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Purposeful availment essentially concerns the relationship between
the individual and society. It derives largely, but not exclusively, from
the individualist theme. The general idea is that jurisdiction is justified
through a defendant's purposeful act in relation to the forum state. The
Court frequently ties this idea to whether the defendant was able to fore-
79. It is important to note that the rhetoric of modem Supreme Court decisions suggests
that personal jurisdiction has stabilized. Thus, in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court describes In-
ternational Shoe as a fundamental break with the kind of analysis represented by Pennoyer and
suggests that the modem due process analysis of personal jurisdiction now hews the Interna-
tional Shoe line. 433 U.S. 186, 227 (1977). Similarly, the Court insists in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982), that modern
cases such as World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), are not con-
cerned with state soveriegnity considerations independent of an individual rights focus.
Such statements might reflect the proportionate mix of the four themes in vogue at a
particular point in time among a majority of the Court; or they might simply reflect a rhetori-
cal preference for discussing personal jurisdiction in terms of individual rights, rather than
state soveriegnity. In either case, the following discussion of three post-International Shoe
cases suggests that, notwithstanding these pronouncements, the themes commonly associated
with Pennoyer (including the state soveriegnty theme) continue to influence the outcome of
personal jurisdiction cases, just as "modem" concerns (such as fairness and nationalism) can
be detected in Pennoyer.
80. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
81. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
82. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
83. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977), quoted in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 94 (1978). As noted supra text accompanying notes 73-75, the idea of purposeful
availment first emerged from the discussion of corporate consent in International Shoe. It
received its full articulation 13 years later in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), when
the Court concluded that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253.
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see being hailed into the forum's court.84 Accordingly, if the defendant
freely chose to engage in activities from which she could anticipate po-
tential litigation arising in the forum, then personal jurisdiction is
grounded in that free choice, and a principal concern of the individualist
theme is satisfied.8 5
More specifically, the concept of purposeful availment rests on the
notion of quid pro quo: the individual owes society a debt in return for
the benefits society has bestowed on him through, among other things, its
laws. 86 This debt is satisfied, in part, through the individual's submission
to the orderly process of adjudication. As suggested earlier, 87 the princi-
ple of quid pro quo has both individualist and communitarian dimen-
sions. It is individualist in the sense that it expresses ideas of contract-
the defendant has freely chosen to accept obligations in exchange for ben-
efits. The principle is communitarian in the sense that it expresses the
idea that the society, through the forum, conferred benefits on the de-
fendant and has a right to hold her accountable. This latter idea focuses
not on subjective choice, but on objective fairness; it expresses not princi-
ples of actual contract, but those of quasi-contract, of unjust
enrichment. 88
a. Kulko v. Superior Court
In Kulko, a California court asserted jurisdiction over a New York
defendant for the purpose of increasing the amount of child-support he
should pay to his ex-wife, who was domiciled in California with primary
custody of their children. The defendant objected that this exercise of
jurisdiction violated his due process rights.- The United States Supreme
Court held that whether the defendant had the requisite minimum con-
tacts with California hinged on whether he had "'purposefully availed
himself' of the 'benefits and protections' of California's laws."' 89
The key contact with the state was the defendant's decision to send
his daughter (at her request) to live in California with her mother for
84. E.g., Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
86. Cf Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940) ("an incident of domicile is ame-
nability to suit within the state"); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) ("Amenability
to a defendant's cross-action is the price a state may exact as a condition of opening its courts
to a plaintiff").
87. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
88. An analogy to restitution principles also suggests itself, but such an analogy can be
misleading. World-Wide Volkswagen teaches that causing bad effects within a state may not be
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 287, 299. Thus, it is the benefit to the defendant,
not injury to others, that triggers the obligation described as a quidpro quo.
89. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
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most of the year. The Supreme Court concluded that in so acting, the
defendant had not purposefully availed himself of the "benefits and pro-
tections" of California's laws. At first, this conclusion seemed odd; after
all, the defendant did purposely send his child to California, and he
would undoubtedly benefit from the obligations of child care that Cali-
fornia law would impose on his ex-wife as well as California's regulation
of his own child support obligation and visitation privileges.
But it is clear that the Kulko Court was concerned with a much
narrower "purpose." The Court discounted the above reasons by empha-
sizing that it was the mother, not the defendant, who chose California as
the state of domicile for their child.90 Thus, whatever purpose the de-
fendant had, it was not specifically directed toward California. The
Court summarized this conclusion with a quotation from its earlier opin-
ion in Hanson v. Denckla:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State... [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State .... 91
In short, the defendant did not purposefully avail himself of California's
benefits because he had not participated in the choice of that state as the
domicile of the mother and children. This emphasis on the defendant's
power of choice is highly individualistic.
At the same time, the Kulko Court supported its conclusion with an
appeal to communitarian values-objective, public concerns for fairness
and reasonableness:
[B]asic considerations of fairness point decisively in favor of [New
York] as the proper forum for adjudication of this case, whatever the
merits of [the mother's] underlying claim .... As noted above, appel-
lant did no more than acquiesce in the stated preference of one of his
children to live with her mother in California. This single act is surely
not one that a reasonable parent would expect to result in the substan-
tial financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child-support
suit in a forum 3,000 miles away, and we therefore see no basis on
which it can be said that appellant could reasonably have anticipated
being "haled before a [California] court."' 9 2
These communitarian values also require consideration of the forum
state's stake in the litigation. In this regard, the Court addressed Califor-
nia's "substantial interests in protecting the welfare of its minor residents
and in promoting to the fullest extent possible a healthy and supportive
90. Id. at 93-94.
91. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)).
92. Id. at 97-98 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
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family environment in which the children of the State are to be raised."'93
However, this interest could have been vindicated through either Califor-
nia or New York's versions of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act which would have permitted the mother to file her
child-support claim in California and have it adjudicated in New York.94
Thus, the balancing of the interests of the defendant, California, and (by
implication) the plaintiff-a technique expressive of the communitarian
theme-pointed toward New York, not California, as the appropriate
forum.9
5
The discussion of Pennoyer and International Shoe emphasized the
tension between the individualist and the communitarian themes. As
Kulko illustrates, these themes, though fundamentally different, can in
certain factual settings point in the same direction: both suggested the
inappropriateness of California as the forum for the Kulko litigation.
The Kulko opinion provides less discussion of the state sovereignty
and nationalist themes. As suggested above, the very notion of minimum
contacts reflects an ongoing concern with territorial sovereignty. At the
same time, the Court in Kulko acknowledged the nationalist theme run-
ning through the cases. It used references to the "nationalization of com-
merce" and to "modern transportation and communication" 96 to
distinguish this domestic relations problem from the kind of commercial
activity in which the significance of state borders diminishes. 97
This latter point suggests just how much the result in Kulko is a
function of the particular mix of themes in the Court's analysis. The
emphasis on the individualist and communitarian themes led the Court
to think about personal jurisdiction, particularly purposeful availment, in
fairly restrictive terms. Had the Court focused more attention on the
nationalist theme, it might have concluded that, like commerce, child
support has become a problem of national rather than local concern in a
society characterized by mobility and increasing fragmentation of the
family.98 This, in turn, would have argued for attaching less significance
to state lines in child-support litigation and for a correspondingly more
liberal approach to the issue of California's jurisdictional reach.
93. Id. at 98.
94. Id. at 98-100.
95. But see Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254 (apparently rejecting a balancing approach).
96. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101 (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222-
23 (1957)).
97. Id.; see id. at 97.
98. The very existence of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act suggests
the national scope of child-support issues, just as the Uniform Commercial Code helps us view
commerce as a national phenomenon.
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b. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
In Burger King, the Burger King Corporation sued the owner of one
of its Michigan franchises in Florida, where Burger King was incorpo-
rated and had its principal place of business. The franchisee did business
exclusively in Michigan; its contacts with the Burger King Corporation
were largely through the latter's Michigan district office, and supervision
and support services came from that district office. Nevertheless, analyz-
ing whether the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the bene-
fits and protection of Florida law,99 the Supreme Court held that Florida
could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. 100
In reaching its conclusion, the Court focused on two contacts be-
tween the defendant and Florida. First, the defendant "most certainly
knew that he was affiliating himself with an enterprise based primarily in
Florida."10 1 The defendant initiated negotiations leading to the franchise
arrangement, sent all fees and notices to the Florida headquarters, and
apparently dealt directly with some of the Florida personnel when
trouble arose in the operation of the franchise.1 02 Yet, while it is clear
that the defendant purposefully affiliated himself with Burger King, it
does not follow that he purposefully affiliated himself with Florida (any
more than Kulko had purposefully affiliated himself with California
when he sent his daughter to her mother). 103
Second, the Court noted that the franchise agreement between de-
fendant and Burger King specified that it would be governed by Florida
law. This contractual provision, the Court concluded, indicated that the
defendant had "purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protec-
tion of Florida's laws." 1°4 But the provision was inserted into the form
contract by Burger King, and its purpose was certainly to benefit Burger
99. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487.
100. Id. at 482.
101. Id. at 480.
102. Id. at 481.
103. It has been suggested to me that the franchisee's action was more purposeful than
Kulko's-the franchisee sought out a contact with Burger King while Kulko was merely re-
sponding to his daughter's wishes. This seems to me mistaken. Each defendent acted to make
a contact with the forum state. (The franchisee contacted Burger King, and Kulko sent his
daughter to his former wife in California.) The franchisee and Kulko clearly had different
motives in making their respective contacts. (The franchisee made his contact with Florida to
make money; Kulko made his contact with California to satisfy his daughter's wish.) Each
motive was presumably important to the respective defendent. I do not see the difference in
the motivation for each defendent's actions affects the purposefulness of those actions.
104. Id. at 482 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1513 (1984)
(Johnson, J., dissenting)).
July 1987] PERSONAL JURISDICTION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
King, not the defendant. 10 5
All this seems to suggest that "purposeful availment" was being ap-
plied differently in Burger King than in Kulko. This difference is con-
firmed by the Burger King Court's general discussion of the concept.
Purposeful availment, according to the Court, is established when a de-
fendant " 'purposefully directs' his activities toward forum residents"
and the litigation relates to those activities' 06-a characterization that
perfectly describes Kulko's activities.
Thus, Burger King expanded the meaning of purposeful availment.
Kulko required that the defendant choose a particular forum in which to
conduct beneficial activities. In Burger King, it was enough to enter into
a beneficial relationship with someone who happened to be in a particular
forum.
Underlying the difference in the definition of purposeful availment is
a difference in the proportionate weight given the four jurisdictional
themes. Nationalism, invoked only in passing in Kulko, comes to the
fore in Burger King. The Court reminded us that "it is an inescapable
fact of modem commercial life that a substantial amount of business is
transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines,
thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which
business is conducted." 10 7 Moreover, determining the legitimacy of an
assertion of personal jurisdiction requires consideration of "the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies" as well as the "shared interest of the several States in further-
ing fundamental substantive social policies." 10 8  These nationalist
observations naturally create pressure to think of personal jurisdiction in
expansive terms. The Burger King Court reacted to this pressure by
broadening the meaning of purposeful availment.
c. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
World-Wide Volkswagen, decided after Kulko and before Burger
105. Because its franchises are scattered far and wide, it was clearly in Burger King's
interest to specify a single state's law to govern all franchise agreements, thereby achieving
uniformity of results. See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir.
1955).
106. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.
107. Id. at 476. This represents an interesting metamorphosis of the nationalist theme.
Pre-International Shoe cases explained the expansive reach of jurisdiction in commercial cases
in terms of the business entity being "present" in those places where it conducted business. See
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 79 (1914). This metaphor of presence was
abandoned in International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
108. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
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King, shows us yet a different mix of the jurisdictional themes, leading to
a restrictive view of purposeful availment. This products liability case
began in Oklahoma. The action arose out of an automobile accident in
that state. The plaintiff's injuries were allegedly caused by a defective
car purchased in New York from Seaway Volkswagen, one of the retail
dealerships for cars distributed regionally by World-Wide Volkswagen, a
New York corporation. The Supreme Court held that Oklahoma's exer-
cise of jurisdiction violated the due process rights of Seaway and World-
Wide. 109
Once again, much of the Court's analysis focused on the question of
purposeful availment. The Court held that since Seaway and World-
Wide did not directly sell automobiles to customers in Oklahoma, they
had not purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protections of
Oklahoma's laws.' 10
But this analysis is not obviously correct. As the dissenters pointed
out, modem automobiles are frequently driven to distant places and are
designed for such travel. Moreover, the construction and maintenance of
roads for automobile travel in distant states like Oklahoma benefitted
World-Wide and Seaway by increasing the demand for their cars.11' In-
deed, as the majority had to concede, "[i]t is foreseeable that the purchas-
ers of automobiles sold by World-Wide and Seaway may take them to
Oklahoma." 112
If the notion of purposeful availment adopted in World- Wide Volk-
swagen seems a bit farfetched, consider that the Court cited with appar-
ent approval' 13 the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 114 In Gray, the Titan
Valve Manufacturing Company, an Ohio corporation, sold valves outside
of Illinois to American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation,
which used the valves in the construction of hot water heaters in Penn-
sylvania. American Radiator, which had customers throughout the
country, sold one of these heaters to a consumer in Illinois. Allegedly as
a result of a defect in one of Titan's valves, the heater exploded in Illinois
and caused injuries. The court held that Illinois could exercise jurisdic-
109. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-99.
110. Id. at 297-98.
111. See id. at 298-99; id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
112. Id. at 298.
113. Id. at 297-98.
114. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Some question is raised about the current
status of the analysis employed in Gray by the Court's dicta in Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior
Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). See infra note 143.
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tion over Titan.1 5 Titan presumably expected that American would sell
heaters containing Titan's valves in Illinois, and Titan benefited from
those Illinois sales and "from the protection which [Illinois] law has
given to the marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves." 116
Thus, the foreseeability that heaters containing Titan's valves would
be sold in Illinois, even though the specific decision to sell the heaters
was made, not by Titan, but by Titan's customer, was sufficient to sustain
Illinois' jurisdiction over Titan in Gray. Yet the foreseeability that cars
sold in New York would be used in Oklahoma, even though the specific
decision to take a car to Oklahoma was made unilaterally by the cus-
tomer, was not sufficient to sustain Oklahoma's jurisdiction over Seaway
and World-Wide Volkswagen. In short, defendants in both cases benefit-
ted from the ultimate use of their product in the forum state, and that use
was foreseeable.
The World-Wide Volkswagen Court avoided discussing these possi-
ble inconsistencies with Gray by highlighting the individualist theme. If
automobile sellers could be sued wherever the buyer drove the car, then
"[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for
service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chat-
tel."117 Such a result would smack of tying jurisdiction to the "unilateral
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defend-
ant' 118-an approach disapproved in Hanson 19 and Kulko.120 In
short, jurisdiction in such a situation would be a product of the plain-
tiff's, not defendant's, choice.
In World- Wide Volkswagen, the theme of state sovereignty was just
as influential as the individualist theme. The Court repeatedly pointed
out that the purpose of the minimum contacts limitation on jurisdiction
is "to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out be-
yond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in
a federal system."'121 In short, that limitation is the "consequence of ter-
ritorial limitations on the power of the respective states."'122 This view is
obviously reminiscent of Pennoyer.
115. Gray, 211 Ill. 2d at 444, 176 N.E.2d at 767.
116. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
117. World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296.
118. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
119. 357 U.S. at 253.
120. 436 U.S. at 98; see supra note 90 and accompanying text. Rejection of this approach
also rests on the communitarian theme of fairness: Why should a local business have to defend
an action in a remote forum simply because a customer chose to take the product there?
121. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
122. Id. at 294 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251).
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The emphasis of the individualist and state sovereignty themes in
World- Wide Volkswagen led to an articulation of personal jurisdiction in
relatively narrow terms, and, in particular, to a restriction of the concept
of purposeful availment. Hence, even though World-Wide Volkswagen is
a commercial case like Burger King, the particular interplay of themes in
the former case tends to narrow the crucial jurisdictional concepts in a
manner more reminiscent of Kulko.
These three cases, with their varying interpretations of purposeful
availment, might seem inconsistent and thus confused. But the truth is
that the term purposeful availment can mean different things; its mean-
ing can be expanded and contracted. Thus, while the meanings given the
phrase in the three cases are inconsistent, they are also all "correct." 123
What correlates with the particular meaning used in a particular case is
the particular mix of the four jurisdictional themes that appeals to the
majority of the Court. This relationship between the coexistence of irrec-
oncilable themes and the indeterminacy of legal doctrine pervades the
law.
H. The Nature of Legal Argument
We find the idea of black letter law so appealing because we imagine
that the development of legal doctrine is an ongoing process of defining
ever more clearly and precisely our legal relationships, rights, and duties.
In short, we see legal argument as the pursuit and identification of
rules. 124
The foregoing analysis suggests a different model. I have tried to
present personal jurisdiction doctrine as a pulsating mass with irreconcil-
able parts, as an amoeba whose shape continually changes within a con-
fining membrane. Moreover, I assert that this characterization is not
limited to personal jurisdiction; it describes all legal doctrine.
Why should this be so? One possible explanation currently receiv-
ing some attention in legal literature, is that all ideas and perceptions
about the real world are fundamentally arbitrary; they represent artificial
ways of dividing up the world that we impose upon it. Since our ideas
and perceptions lack roots in the world, they are unstable when used as
123. "Correct" is used here as an analytical judgment, not a normative one. Each mean-
ing of purposeful availment is correct in that it is logically consistent with certain mixes of the
four themes developed in the precedents.
124. An interesting example of this phenomenon is the treatment of choice-of-law in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971), which seeks to develop concrete
rules in the long run through the ad hoc consideration of several specified themes. See gener-
ally Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972).
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tools for dealing with the world. Legal doctrine, which purports to be a
tool for dealing with the world, simply shares a quality common to all
products of human thought.125
Another theory can be built on psychological data that suggests we
experience ourselves as both separate from the outside world and at-
tached to the world.126 Thus, we would sensibly expect our ideas about
the world, including our legal and other relationships, to simultaneously
express notions of alienation and community. The four themes of juris-
diction reflect this ambivalence on both a personal level-the individual-
ist and communitarian themes-and a political level-the state
sovereignty and nationalist themes.
Whatever the truth of these explanations, it is certainly true that one
of the essential purposes of legal doctrine is to serve as a tool for resolv-
ing conflicts-conflicts that arise out of different material interests, differ-
ent points of view, different ways of thinking about the world. Legal
doctrine-be it promissory estoppel, negligence, or personal jurisdic-
tion-seeks to accommodate these differences. But the differences are
fundamental; they cannot be accommodated. They do not vanish in the
face of developing legal doctrine. Rather, they are contained in perpetual
tension within legal doctrine.
Synthesizing cases, reading a group of precedents in search of the
threads that give coherence to the doctrine they collectively express 127 is
the process that uncovers the irreconcilable themes. It is those very
themes that give legal doctrine its coherence.128 Paradoxically, it is those
very themes that make legal doctrine mutable.
This view of legal doctrine as a fabric made of interwoven themes is
sometimes expressly adopted by courts. For example, those jurisdictions
that adopt Robert Leflar's approach to choice-of-law problems address
those problems through a straightforward discussion of five "choice-in-
fluencing considerations": predictability of results, maintenance of inter-
state and international order, furtherance of the forum state's interests,
simplification of the judicial task, and application of the better rule of
125. This view and its implications for legal reasoning are explored in Peller, The Meta-
physics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985).
126. See Gilligan, Remapping Development: The Power of Divergent Data, in VALUE PRE-
SUPPOSITION IN THEORIES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (L. Cirillo & S. Wagner eds. 1986); cf
Kennedy, supra note 29.
127. See Greenstein, Teaching Case Synthesis, 2 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1985).
128. This point needs emphasis: Coherence does not require determinacy. Two courts
wrestling with the four jurisdictional themes in the same case might resolve those themes
differently and reach different results. Nevertheless, since they are confronting the same
themes, each would understand what the other is doing; thus, the doctrine is coherent.
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law. 129 These five themes, like the four jurisdictional themes, vary in
terms of relative proportion from case to case. 130 Significantly, Leflar
suggests that choice-of-law decisions, even those by courts that do not
overtly refer to the five choice-influencing considerations, can be most
satisfactorily accounted for in terms of those themes. 131
Approaches to issues that call for a balancing of interests are simi-
lar. This technique is, for example, commonly used in procedural due
process notice-and-hearing cases.' 32 The idea is to resolve the question of
what process is due by simultaneously considering distinct and often con-
flicting interests. The metaphor of balance, however, is misleading. It
suggests that the contending forces can be resolved, that an objective
point of equilibrium can be reached. But the "balance" often can be de-
fensibly struck at many points. The interests are irreconcilable; they can
all be considered, but in many cases they cannot all be accommodated.
In those cases, one or more of the interests must be compromised; within
limits determined by precedents, an infinite number of formulas for com-
promise are possible. 133
An understanding of the coexistence of irreconcilable themes within
legal doctrine helps explain the difference between "easy cases" and
"hard cases."' 134 Here are two examples of easy jurisdictional cases:
1. I am involved in a boundary dispute with my neighbor con-
cerning an alley that runs between our homes. We both live in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania. My neighbor files suit in the appropriate
Philadelphia court. I am personally served with process at my house,
in accordance with state law.
2. I am involved in the same boundary dispute. My neighbor,
while vacationing in Alaska (with which I have no contacts) files suit
in a Fairbanks court, which serves me by registered mail in accordance
with the state's long-arm statute.
Does the Philadelphia court have personal jurisdiction over me?
Yes. How about the Fairbanks court? Of course not. These are easy
cases. The application of jurisdictional doctrine to these facts is clear.
129. E.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Mitchell v. Craft,
211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966). See generally
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 96-109 (3d ed. 1977); Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More
on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
130. R. LEFLAR, supra note 129, §§ 96-108.
131. Id. § 108.
132. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319 (1976).
133. For a discussion of irreconcilable models of contract and tort law, see Feinman &
Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 882-88 (1985).
134. The problem of "hard cases" is explored at length in R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
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There are "right answers." 135
Why? Because as applied to each factual situation, the four themes
that constitute jurisdictional doctrine lead to the same conclusion. The
individualist, communitarian, state sovereignty, and nationalist princi-
ples that emerge from a synthesis of the precedents all point to the exist-
ence of jurisdiction in the first case and the absence of jurisdiction in the
second. 136
Some cases are hard. Consider the following facts:
I purchase a rare parrot from a small pet store in Camden, New
Jersey, just across the Delaware River from my home in Philadelphia.
The parrot dies the next day. The store owner, a New Jersey domicili-
ary (who does not advertise outside of New Jersey), refuses to refund
the purchase price. I sue in Philadelphia.
Can the Philadelphia court constitutionally exercise jurisdiction
over the Camden pet store owner? The jurisdictional themes seem to
point in different directions. The state sovereignty theme, with its terri-
torial limitations on power, argues against jurisdiction. Similarly, the in-
dividualist theme, which sees personal jurisdiction exclusively in terms of
voluntary submission or physical power, also weighs against finding ju-
risdiction. On the other hand, state boundaries have little significance in
the context of the nationalist theme, particularly with regard to business
enterprises with interstate aspects. Moreover, looking at the communi-
135. The term "right answer" refers to an outcome that inevitably follows from the con-
sideration of particular facts in the context of legal doctrine. As with the terms "correct,"
supra note 123, and "legitimate," infra note 138, I mean to express no normative judgment by
the phrase.
136. When I say that the four themes all lead to a particular result in each of the hypothet-
icals in the text, I am not making any absolute statement about the content of those themes. It
seems obvious to me, for example, that concepts like "fair play" and "substantial justice" are
sufficiently vague to be usable in constructing arguments against jurisdiction in the first hypo-
thetical and supporting jurisdiction in the second.
Thus, I must qualify my assertions about the function of the themes in easy cases in two
ways. First, I am predicting the behavior ofjudges. My point is not that we must (nor that we
necessarily should) understand the themes in particular ways, but that judges do understand
the themes in particular ways-ways that they derive from the reasoning contained in prece-
dents. See infra note 139. Accordingly, the rulings of judges in vast numbers of cases can be
predicted with great precision. Second, I am speaking about the present. It is certainly possi-"
ble that any case that is easy today might become hard in the future as the thinking about the
themes evolves. But that potential does not make those cases hard today; it does not mean that
any judge will at the present seriously consider novel arguments in those cases. Indeed, one of
the characteristics of easy cases is that they are generally resolved summarily without signifi-
cant debate. Debate takes place in the hard cases and may ultimately change judges' percep-
tions of what were once thought to be easy cases. My conclusion, thus qualified, is modest: At
any given time, the outcomes of an enormous number of cases can be predicted with virtual
certainty, regardless what arguments are offered to the judge. In this pragmatic sense, there
are "easy" cases.
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tarian theme, there seems to be nothing particularly unfair about requir-
ing the pet store owner to travel two miles to defend in the court of a
state that has an interest in providing a forum for resident plaintiffs.
A more detailed analysis of this problem reveals its key: the tension
between the state sovereignty and nationalist themes. By emphasizing
one or the other of these themes, the lawyer can affect the orientation of
the individualist and communitarian themes.
Thus, the argument against jurisdiction might go like this: Respect
for the sovereignty of New Jersey strictly limits the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by Pennsylvania to persons or property within its borders. The one
exception (to be construed narrowly so as not to swallow the rule of terri-
torial sovereignty) is that jurisdiction can be exercised over absent de-
fendants who voluntarily submit or consent to the court's authority.
Here the defendant has not expressly consented to jurisdiction, nor has
she advertised in Pennsylvania or otherwise conducted activities in that
state so as to give rise to an implication of consent. In other words, she
has not purposefully availed herself of the benefits of Pennsylvania law.
Her business activities are essentially local; they do not involve the kind
of national commercial operations that render state boundaries insignifi-
cant. The test for personal jurisdiction is whether the defendant has had
minimum contacts with the forum. The only contact between the de-
fendant and Pennsylvania in this case is the plaintiff's trip to New Jersey
to make a purchase. Precedent makes clear that subjecting a defendant
to jurisdiction based on the unilateral activity of the plaintiff is not con-
sistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
An opposing argument requires simply a shift in emphasis from
state sovereignty to nationalism: Retail activities are artificially con-
tained within state borders. Economically, Philadelphia and Camden, by
virtue of their proximity, constitute a single region; there is a free and
constant flow of customers between the shopping districts of the two cit-
ies. Accordingly, anyone who runs a store in either city should reason-
ably expect that some portion of the business will come from nonresident
customers, especially if one deals in rare items. Just as it is foreseeable
that the defendant would serve Philadelphia customers, so she would ex-
pect to have recourse to Pennsylvania courts when customers from that
state fail to pay. Since sales to Pennsylvania residents and reliance on
Pennsylvania courts constitute foreseeable components of the defendant's
business activities, she has purposefully availed herself of the benefits of
Pennsylvania and the protection of its laws. Moreover, since the defend-
ant has chosen to engage in business activities with Pennsylvania resi-
dents and to avail herself of that state's benefits, she can foresee the
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possibility of litigation related to her business activities against her in
Pennsylvania courts. As noted above, requiring her to travel a couple of
miles to defend in such litigation seems reasonable and fair and thus does
not offend communitarian values. Finally, since jurisdiction is not solely
an assertion of power across borders, but flows from choices freely made
by the defendant (the analogies here are to consent and submission), it
does not offend notions of territorial sovereignty.
Kulko, World-Wide Volkswagen, and Burger King were also hard
cases. The various objections made in the discussions of those cases137 to
the Supreme Court's analysis were not suggestions that the Court's rea-
soning was irrational. The point, rather, was that the Court's reasoning
was based on a particular mix of the four jurisdictional themes; a differ-
ent mix would rationally support the opposite conclusion. Implicit in
this point is the idea that legitimate legal arguments on an issue-argu-
ments perceived to have some persuasive value13 8-are based on themes
uncovered through synthesis of the precedents relating to that issue.
Conversely, arguments that cannot be connected to one or more themes
constituting the applicable doctrine have no persuasive value.
The degree to which legitimate arguments integrate the themes
measures the quality of the arguments. An argument based on a single
theme is credible; one that uses the other themes in supporting roles is
more persuasive. The degree of integration is particularly important in
hard cases since the themes tend to pull in opposite directions. 139 As the
foregoing discussion of the jurisdictional cases and hypothetical of the
dead parrot suggest, emphasis on one theme can be used to expand or
contract the principles and concepts derived from other themes. By at-
tending carefully to this interplay of themes, coherent arguments of great
subtlety can be constructed.
None of this, of course, explains why a particular argument, with its
particular mix of themes, will appeal to a court in one case, while a differ-
ent argument, with a different mix of themes, will appeal to the court in
137. See supra notes 91-93, 95-104 & 111-12 and accompanying text.
138. "Legitimate" here describes the experience of reasonableness, of persuasive value; it is
not intended to imply a normative judgment. When all the themes lead to a single conclusion,
no legitimate argument can be made for the opposite result. That is an easy case. Since hard
cases involve conflicting themes, legitimate arguments can be made supporting opposite
conclusions.
139. Why should the themes "lead" anywhere at all? To some extent the themes are rid-
den with ambiguities just like the doctrine of which they are constituent parts. As a commu-
nity concerned with understanding the themes of jurisdictional doctrine, however, we share a
narrow range of understanding of those themes. Stanley Fish has explored the possible origin
of this shared view in the institution of law itself and in the web of social institutions encom-
passing law. See, e.g., Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984).
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another case. Nor does it explain why the same argument will appeal
differently to different courts. Why, for example, did expansive national-
ist themes dominate in Burger King, while restrictive state sovereignty
themes dominated in World-Wide Volkswagen? Why did the World-
Wide Volkswagen Court approvingly cite Gray, which reached the oppo-
site result, but is analytically indistinguishable?
If the jurisdictional themes will support opposite conclusions in
these hard cases, then the choice of legal arguments based on those
themes is clearly not a matter of logical necessity. One nonlogical com-
parison of World-Wide Volkswagen and Gray could focus on the chains
that connected the defendants in the two cases to the respective forums.
In Gray, the chain was a series of business transactions. (Titan sold
valves to American, which sold a water heater to an Illinois customer.)
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the last link was the activity of a private
party. (World-Wide distributed to Seaway, which sold to a private cus-
tomer, who drove to Oklahoma.) To a particular judge, this difference
might give each case a different "feel." Gray "feels" like a commercial
case. Thus, the nationalist themes typically associated with commercial
cases may be perceived as more persuasive. Moreover, the high degree of
commercial dependence on benefits and remedies given by state law
might highlight the communitarian dimension of purposeful availment.
On the other hand, World- Wide Volkswagen "feels" like a tort
case.14° Since tort cases traditionally have a strong territorial focus, 141
state sovereignty themes may well seem more pertinent. Furthermore,
the traditional focus on subjective fault in tort cases' 42 might underscore
the individualist dimension of purposeful availment. Viewed in this light,
Burger King makes sense. It is a quintessential commercial case. Hence,
the predominance of the jurisdiction-expanding nationalist themes is
unsurprising.
The foregoing discussion of Gray, World-Wide Volkswagen, and
Burger King is not intended to present some particular psychological the-
140. The world is, of course, not itself divided into tort problems and commercial
problems; this is a distinction that we impose upon the world. See Peller, supra note 125.
Moreover, the situation is circular: If cases like Gray and World- Wide Volkswagen reflect this
distinction, they also reinforce it. That sense of circularity-that we are somehow trapped in a
particular way of perceiving the world and that this perception both creates the themes of legal
doctrine and is reinforced by them-lies at the heart of structuralist analysis. See generally
Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1984).
141. For example, traditional choice-of-law theory looks to the lex loci delicti to determine
the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties in tort litigation. See, e.g., Alabama Great
S.R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,
§§ 378-379, 384-387, 390-391, 393, 412, 421 (1934).
142. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 608-09 (5th ed. 1984).
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ory of adjudication nor to describe a universal reaction to the cases.1 43
Rather, it is to emphasize the nonrational component of legal argument
and judicial decision-making in hard cases.
The themes of the personal jurisdiction cases determine the contours
of legitimate legal arguments about jurisdiction. In easy cases, such ar-
guments will inevitably lead to one conclusion. 1 Hard cases are differ-
ent. Legitimate arguments can be made in opposite directions, and
nothing about the themes can determine which legitimate argument a
judge will find more persuasive than others. If the persuasive power of
arguments does not come from their internal logic, then the challenge of
legal theory is to account for that power in other terms. 145
Legal theory must also account for legal rights. Specifically, the no-
tion of legal rights seems intuitively to make sense in an easy case, in
which only one substantive result is correct.146 But if it is true that legit-
imate legal arguments in hard cases can support different results, then
does it not follow that legal rights do not exist in such cases? Section III
addresses this question.
III. Rights and Right Answers
A question that has always stirred much controversy in legal philos-
143. The contingent nature of these reactions is illustrated by comparing the majority
opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen with the dissents of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun. Moreover, the Court has recently split over the validity of the Gray analysis.
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987). Four members of the Court con-
cluded that the mere introduction of a product into the stream of commerce is insufficient to
subject the manufacturer to jurisdiction in a state where that product ultimately causes an
injury. Id. at 1033 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Four other members reached the oppo-
site conclusion. Id. at 1035-38 (Brennan, J., concurring). The ninth Justice held that each
case must be analyzed on its own facts, but that the "stream-of-commerce" analysis would
normally support jurisdiction in the case of a manufacturer doing a large volume of business.
Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring). It thus appears that a bare majority would continue to
approve the result in Gray.
144. See Michelman, Politics as Medicine: On Misdiagnosing Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1224, 1227 (1981).
145. Of course, the mystery of persuasive power is significant not only in hard cases: it lies
at the heart of legal argument generally. This Essay has sought to describe the connection
between persuasive arguments and the themes contained in legal doctrine, but has not explored
why that connection should exist, nor why we find arguments that are not connected to the
themes unpersuasive. Stanley Fish has argued that our ability to interpret legal doctrine and
thereby to assign meaning to doctrine is necessarily constrained by certain shared understand-
ings about the context in which that interpretation takes place. See Fish, supra note 139. If
that is true, then arguments that would assign a meaning to jurisdictional doctrine falling
outside those constraints will be experienced as irrational. The four jurisdictional themes ex-
press those constraints.
146. For the meaning of "correct," see supra note 123
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ophy is whether one can truly be said to have legal rights. 147 What do we
mean by legal rights? Where might they come from? How do we know
what they are?
A separate question is whether the law provides right answers.1 48 Is
the law determinate? Or is the logical form of legal argument simply a
fagade, masking the susceptibility of all legal questions to opposite
resolutions?
These two questions can be merged. Ronald Dworkin does so when
he grounds legal rights in the law's alleged capacity to produce determi-
nate answers to all legal questions. Dworkin pictures the law as a com-
plex of principles that have emerged over time.1 49 The judge can employ
these principles, with their relative weights, to resolve any legal issue.150
Parties appearing before a court traditionally argue their cases in
terms of rights. What they mean is that, in fairness, they should be
treated in a way consistent with the way in which similarly situated peo-
ple have been treated in the past.15 1 To treat parties as others have been
treated in the past, the judge must identify the applicable principles, give
them their appropriate weight, and apply them to the facts to determine
the right answer. In easy cases, the identification and application of the
relevant principles are easy. In hard cases they are hard. But there is no
fundamental difference between how the law is applied in hard and easy
cases.
By contrast, H.L.A. Hart sees easy and hard cases as involving es-
sentially different enterprises. The state authorizes judges to apply legal
rules to the cases before them. 152 In easy cases, the rules specify the
147. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 134passim; Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62
TEX. L. Rv. 1363 (1984).
148. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 134.
149. Id. at 105-23.
150. The relationship between the themes of personal jurisdiction and specific jurisdic-
tional principles can be illustrated by the following:
One principle is that a state may exercise power over any person found within its borders.
Another principle is that a court should not associate itself with wrongdoing. These principles
must be harmonized when, for example, a defendent is fraudulently induced to enter a state
and is then served with process. Generally, the courts have resolved this problem by treating
the principle of avoiding wrongdoing as a qualification to (or weightier than) the principle of
plenary soveriegnty over persons inside the state's border. See, e.g., Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala.
284, 3 So. 321 (1888).
The principle of plenary soveriegnty expresses the state soveriegnty theme of personal
jurisdiction, and the principle of avoiding wrongdoing expresses the communitarian theme. In
general, one could say that principles are normative statements that express one or more doc-
trinal themes.
151. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 134, at 112-15.
152, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 29, 94-95 (1961).
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outcome; there are right answers. In hard cases, the issue falls within
what Hart calls the "open texture" of the law.153 Here, the rules are
unable to determine the result. In such cases, the judge is authorized
simply to make a decision one way or the other, thereby modifying the
rules so as to henceforth determine the resolution of similar cases.' 54 Ac-
cordingly, such cases become easy in the future. Thus, parties have legal
rights in easy cases. But it is meaningless to talk about legal rights in
hard cases.
Finally, some scholars, including some representatives of American
Legal Realism 155 and Critical Legal Studies 56 view law as essentially
subjective, indeterminate, and political; there are no right answers in the
sense that such answers are rationally deducible from a closed system of
law. These qualities of subjectivity, indeterminacy, and ideology are tra-
ditionally hidden by the apparent logic and rationality with which legal
arguments are clothed. This skeptical view attacks the facade of logic
and rationality and exposes the essential manipulability of legal doctrine.
The implications of this view for the question of legal rights are am-
biguous. Strictly speaking, the view suggests that legal rights do not ex-
ist. The indeterminacy of law means that all arguments for the existence
of a right can be countered with arguments for its nonexistence and that
there is no logical basis for choosing between these sets of arguments.
Looked at another way, the question of legal rights is subsumed within
the larger question of political and social morality: How should we treat
one another? If this question cannot be resolved by the logical applica-
tion of rules and principles (indeed, if it cannot be resolved at all), then it
is a matter for ongoing dialogue and ongoing choices.' 57 The language of
"rights" may be inadequate to describe or facilitate that process. 158
These three radically different approaches share a common idea:
The existence of legal rights is inextricably tied to the ability of a legal
system to produce determinate answers to specific legal questions. A de-
tailed exploration of these issues is well beyond the scope of this Essay.
However, the discussion in sections I and II suggest a somewhat different
way of thinking about legal rights and right answers, which at least par-
tially disentangles the two issues.
153. Id. at 120, 124-32. The phrase "open texture" comes from Friedrich Waismann's
essay Verifiability, in 1 ESSAYS ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 117 (A. Flew ed. 1952).
154. H.L.A. HART, supra note 152, at 128-32. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 134.
155. See, e.g., Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931).
156. See, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1 (1984).
157. Id. at 38-39.
158. See Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 64 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
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Law is fundamentally concerned with values; every case raises the
question how we as individuals and as a collective society ought to act.
Legal doctrine, in the form of constitutional provisions, statutes, admin-
istrative regulations, and precedents, comprises attempts to articulate the
values that we appeal to in order to answer that question. In some cases
those values are consistent, and it is clear how the dispute should be
resolved. However, the values that the law represents are sometimes
conflicting. The process of resolving these hard cases requires that we
enter an ongoing debate over those conflicting values.
On a technical level, this debate is articulated in terms of arguments
about legislative intent or the holding of a case or the ratio decidendi of a
series of precedents. But these are metaphors. What we are really doing
in these arguments is debating how to accommodate in a particular case
the irreconcilable values captured within the applicable statute, case, or
series of cases.
Section II asserts that the legitimacy of a legal argument depends on
its connection to one or more of the themes that inform the legal doctrine
in question. These themes, identified through processes like statutory in-
terpretation and case synthesis, express the multiple values we hold si-
multaneously and irreconcilably regarding the matter at hand. If it is
correct that easy cases are ones in which all of the themes lead to one
conclusion (in which our values are consistent) and hard cases are ones
in which the themes lead to opposite conclusions (in which our values
conflict), then it follows that in easy cases all legitimate arguments lead
to the same conclusion, while in hard cases legitimate arguments lead to
different results. That, in turn, means that easy cases have right answers,
but hard cases do not.
This description of legal argument, however, does not lead to the
concluson that there are legal rights in easy cases, but not in hard ones.
Parties have the same legal right in every case: namely, to be treated the
same as similarly situated litigants in the past. What does that mean? It
means applying the same values to the present case as to past cases-that
is, deciding the case by a conscientious consideration of the themes that
constitute the applicable legal doctrine.
In the easy cases, application of the relevant values, consideration of
the relevant themes, will lead inexorably to a particular result. Because
so many cases are easy, we imagine that the right is really a right to the
substantive result itself. Accordingly, we look for the same right answers
in hard cases (A la Dworkin), or we conclude that hard cases must be an
altogether different phenomenon (A la Hart). But both of these conclu-
sions seem wrong. Hard cases do not have right answers, but neither are
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they radically different from easy cases. Litigants in all cases have pre-
cisely the same right: the right to a limitation on the arguments deemed
legitimate in the case, a limitation that excludes from consideration val-
ues not found in the applicable precedents, statutes, constitutional provi-
sions, and administrative regulations.
Accordingly, the premise shared by Dworkin, Hart, and the skep-
tics-that legal rights are unalterably dependent on the possibility of
right answers-is incorrect. Litigants in every case have the same legal
right, regardless of whether the case has a right answer. 159
Conclusion
In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin teaches us the myth of Judge
Hercules, who can determine the right answers in hard cases. Judge
Hercules has the ability to construct a complete theory of law in which
all principles are accounted for in the most consistent manner possible.
By resort to this theory, Judge Hercules can resolve all cases. 160
Like the idea of black letter law, the myth of Judge Hercules seduces
us. We want coherence; we want right answers; and we want, perhaps
most of all, certainty.
The discussion of the personal jurisdiction cases suggests that we
can have coherence. Four themes and principles derived from those
themes form threads that connect all the cases. Legitimate arguments
must tie into those themes, and legitimate decision-making is limited to a
conscientious consideration of them.
The discussion of the personal jurisdiction cases also suggests that
we can have right answers some of the time. In the easy cases all the
themes point in one direction; there are right answers in such cases.
However, in hard cases the themes, and consequently the arguments,
lead to different, equally right answers.
Thus, we can never have certainty. Hard cases, with more than one
right answer, demonstrate this. But even easy cases are not certain.
Each of us may have a right to conscientious consideration of our legal
problems within the thematic contours of applicable legal doctrine, yet
159. This idea that legal rights are essentially process rights is scarcely new. John Hart
Ely has forcefully argued that the fundamental rights that we have written them into the
Constitution are basically process-oriented. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
Moreover, the so-called internal morality of the law, identified by Lon Fuller as a fundamental
requirement of any legal system, is also concerned exclusively with form and procedure. L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 11 (1964); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 644-45 (1958).
160. R. DWORKIN, supra note 134, at 105-30; see also R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986).
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we have no guarantee that every judge will try to be conscientious nor
that every judge is capable of accurately identifying the themes.
I cannot, of course, disprove Dworkin's contention that if we look
hard enough in hard cases, we will find principles that tell us how to
weigh the contending themes and principles, in short, that we will be able
to determine the right substantive answer. But Dworkin's myth of Judge
Hercules acknowledges the common experience that in hard cases rea-
sonable mortals do not and probably never will reach consensus on the
appropriate substantive outcome. If that is true, then that do we gain by
assuming the existence of ultimately unknowable right answers? One
possibility is that this assumption provides the basis for moral critique.
That is, if we believe there are right answers, then we impose on judges a
duty to conscientiously strive to discover what they are. Upon this con-
clusion rests our ability to define and to criticize arbitrariness in
adjudication. 161
My conclusion is that arbitrariness can be defined another way.
Precedents define the themes around which the debates regarding legal
doctrine must take place, and conscientiousness in adjudication-respect
for the parties' rights-requires analyzing and deciding a particular case
within the limits set by those themes. It is thus that we can have rights
without right answers and rule of law without myth.
161. See id. at 129-30.
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